

Technical Evaluation Report: Effective Interagency Interactions and Governance in Comprehensive Approaches to Operations

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ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview and critical discussion of the HFM-236 Symposium. The Symposium was structured to address the current state-of-the-art with respect to comprehensive approaches to operations and to generate solution approaches for more effective implementations of the approach. Three Keynote addresses and 24 papers provided a variety of perspectives on the issues. Discussions showed that there is a reasonably complete shared understanding of the comprehensive approach among policy makers and policy analysts, but the implementation of the approach at agency level and in the field is hampered by many issues. This report concludes with recommendations on areas where current efforts need to be consolidated, and areas where continued efforts are required. Gaps in our knowledge are also highlighted.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The HFM-236 Symposium, held 7-9 April, 2014, in Stockholm Sweden, was a continuation of years of work on approaches to effective collaboration of joint, multinational and multiagency teams as they address problems in complex operations such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Apart from the military components within this NATO-led security mission, there have been many governmental and non-governmental actors involved in rebuilding government institutions and physical and social infrastructure in a region plagued by conflict for decades. Future missions may have little in common with ISAF. Nevertheless, the complexity of operation and the difficulties of deriving and implementing a multi-party set of solutions are quite likely to be a recurring aspect of NATO missions.

The Call For Papers noted that it is well established that effective interaction, coordination and cooperation is a prerequisite for achieving the level of security that is aimed for in such missions. Today's complex conflicts cannot be solved by military means alone. A combination and multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental organisations closely linked to host nation actors and institutions is thought to be required for developing and maintaining secure environments and long-term development. Combining efforts may also reduce costs by avoiding duplication, permit more responsive decision making, and generate more legitimacy of missions in the eyes of the public.

The general concept of a multinational multiagency mission which also includes non-governmental civilian participation has come to be referred to as a Comprehensive Approach (CA)¹. Several papers in this symposium detail the broad concept of CA as it is variously interpreted by the UN, EU, NATO, and individual governments. One common theme is that the various international organisations and their member states have each produced their own variations in practice. These variations can be quite valuable in that they

¹ In this report I will consistently use CA or the Comprehensive Approach to refer to any of the various implementations of this notion under whatever name. However it must be noted that Whole of Government, the Integrated Approach, Civil Military Coordination, Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational(JIIM) etc. are not just different labels for the same process, but in fact represent subtle variations on the general concept.

provide a natural field experiment of sorts, allowing us to compare and contrast the approaches and derive lessons which will be beneficial to all parties (e.g., see the papers from this Workshop by Peter and by Ekhauegen).

A comprehensive approach under whatever label, as implemented within or across organisations, will include establishing mission goals and discussions on the implementation plans to achieve those goals. As stated in the Call for Papers: a multifirmity of opinions, concepts and ideas, lines of command, principles, ways of working, and actors that have different interests and aims, needs to be addressed (1). Moreover, with often many actors in the field, it takes time to bring the relevant actors together. Coordination among different actors takes funds and capacity, neither of which may be available at the required level. As more actors are brought under the CA umbrella, the responsibility of the governments may become diffused. This change in responsibilities requires new governance concepts. Recognising the value of a broad integrated approach on the one hand and a formidable set of obstacles on the other hand, this symposium was organised:

- *To capture the state of art of comprehensive approaches to operations;*
- *To formulate key principles as the basis for harmonising comprehensive approaches; and,*
- *To generate solution approaches on how to improve the realisation of the comprehensive approach.*

In short, how can we do better, reduce the evident costs of building and maintaining collaborations, and improve the effectiveness of the collaboration, while respecting each other's independence? Moreover, how can we improve the effectiveness of the organisational system by means of functional leadership?

This three-day symposium, then, was designed to identify current CA-relevant theoretical structures and models, with special regards to comprehensive collaborative arrangements, in order to:

1. identify key advances in inter-agency collaborative approaches that are immediately applicable to the operational context;
2. develop theories to support the further development and operationalisation of the comprehensive approach; and,
3. focus further research and development efforts and international research programs.

Bringing together Academics, Defence Scientists, and Operators, the symposium organisers created an environment for intensive information exchange and focused discussion on key principles for improving the implementation of comprehensive approaches to operations. A challenge to all participants was to provide a basis for developing the guidelines for building and maintaining effective collaborative arrangements; a strong emphasis in the Call For Papers was on the importance of data to support conclusions and recommendations. The immediate product of the symposium is to be a NATO publication via STO-CSO, with selected papers to be considered for a subsequent book publication.


2.0 RESEARCH BACKGROUND

The 2014 HFM-236 Symposium may be seen as a direct descendent of the earlier HFM-204 Workshop held in June, 2010. (2) In the Evaluation Report of that workshop, Ad Vogelaar traced the roots of the discussion back to the Human in Command workshop in Breda, The Netherlands. The Breda Human in Command workshop in turn followed on from a Human in Command workshop in Kingston, Ont. Canada in 1998 (3, 4). The two Human in Command workshops shared a concern prompted by the several UN and NATO peace-support operations in the 1990's. The requirements of such operations on military personnel in particular led to an extensive re-examination of many existing notions of command and decision-making.

The reduction of global tensions between the Soviet and Western blocs following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union was replaced by local conflicts among peoples of different ethnicity, religion, or political philosophy in many parts of the globe. Mention of Rwanda, Somalia, or the former Yugoslavia is enough to conjure memories of horrific acts of inhumanity that seem totally out of character with the modern world. For the UN, NATO, and other actors including NATO member nations, military solutions to such situations were elusive and few other options seemed available. The Kingston Human in Command workshop included presentations by Canadian LTG (retd.) Roméo Dallaire and by Dutch Colonel Peer Everts, a former battalion commander. Dallaire had been the Force Commander of UNAMIR, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. He gave a moving account of the ethical and practical dilemmas he encountered when faced with apparent contradictions between his UN mission, his military training and resources, and what he felt were his moral obligations. Colonel Everts had commanded a UN force in Srebrenica some months prior to the massacre which occurred in that city, and talked of the daily (often conflicting) guidance he received from various sources: UN military; UN political; Dutch military; and Dutch political. The events in the early 2000's, including Operation Iraqi Freedom and the engagement of the International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan created new challenges. There followed a still on-going search for effective models of security, assistance and humanitarian relief.

A major issue has been and continues to be the question of mission. Military forces are organised and trained to defeat enemy military forces. The 2000 Human in Command workshop identified a number of challenges for military commanders in peace support operations (4 p. 419); the most important conclusion was that “commanders should have a broader view than only their military mission.” Related conclusions from that workshop spoke to preparation for peace support operations (e.g., the need for an understanding of regional cultures and of the cultural background of given conflicts) and to key processes during mission execution such as the need for rule clarity.

A broad summary of that 2000 workshop would suggest that there is a need to recognise that not all situations are amenable to a military solution, and that the perspectives of other actors in a conflict should be taken into account during planning and execution.



In the interim, between 2000 and the HFM-204 Workshop in 2010, substantial research was accomplished in several areas relating to the Comprehensive Approach model. In particular, several HFM Panels explored issues of teamwork and team dynamics (see chart above). The Leader Development Research Unit and the Basic Research Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute did detailed work on several issues related to effective cooperation in multinational settings, including a general analysis of tasks and skills involved in military cross-cultural collaboration (and the requisite training) (5-9) with particular attention to skills such as social awareness and perspective taking, as well as general cross-cultural competence (10-15). HFM-204 Workshop discussions, however, led to the conclusion that the overall body of research supporting implementation of a comprehensive approach was still weak in several respects. A lack of clarity in conceptualisation and presentation of the comprehensive approach model, a weak-to-nonexistent theoretical underpinning, and a lack of systematic data collection were highlighted as issues. It was hoped that the presentations in the current symposium would address research that may have filled some of these gaps in our knowledge, and suggest how to consolidate and preserve the understanding that has been gained.

3.0 SYMPOSIUM DESCRIPTION AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Opening Address

The symposium opened with welcoming remarks from the Swedish host - Dr. Eva Dalberg - and from the HFM Panel Chair - Dr. John Tangney. Both stressed the importance of the topic at hand and its critical role within the broader scope of the HFM. Dr. Peter Essens then provided a brief summary of the issues related to the Comprehensive Approach and of the history of previous HFM efforts to address this and related topics. He stressed the broad consensus that cooperation in many forms is essential to effective implementation of inter-agency interaction and the comprehensive approach, and challenged the participants to examine potential solutions to the issues that make cooperation difficult to achieve. Cooperation is a hard problem, and both the structural and behavioural prerequisites to cooperation are underestimated and underdeveloped. The goal is to develop solution approaches for realising effective cooperation.

In addition to the presentations, there were to be three breakout groups with a focus, respectively, on Structures, Processes, and Competencies required to facilitate IAI and the CA.

3.2 Presentations²

The initial presentation was the keynote address by Major General Anders Brännström, Chief of Staff of the Swedish Army. Major General Brännström reflected on his experience during two deployments to Kosovo and the lessons he had learned preparing soldiers for such deployments and from working with non-military organisations and individuals. A key point he made was the continuing need for military personnel to have training and experience in working with civilians from other government agencies and from non-governmental groups. However, in response to a question he acknowledged that his priority as Chief of Staff was to prepare Swedish officers to be able to train and develop soldiers for their military role. The need to strike a balance among many competing priorities and goals became an important sub-theme of discussions throughout the symposium.

3.2.1 Structures for Harmonisation of Cooperation

The first session included six papers under the general theme of structures for harmonisation of cooperation between diverse agencies. Williams' (not present) makes two key points in his paper: 1) the need for better understanding of the implications of different levels of analysis when investigating inter-organisational processes; and 2) the need for more attention to the organisational level of analysis. An important sub-theme in his paper is the need for greater conceptual clarity in discussions of interpersonal and organisational interactions. The presentation by Peter compared UN, NATO, and the EU, and discussed the impact of each organisation's identity on its understanding of and implementation of a comprehensive approach. In a similar vein, Ruffa discussed differences in French and Italian implementations of a comprehensive approach. Each nation took on virtually identical roles within ISAF-Afghanistan, with deployments to the same general region of the country, and yet there were significant enduring differences in the way in which successive commanders interacted with non-military actors on the ground.

A particular goal for this symposium was to explore approaches which might facilitate effective coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among different agencies within a nation. Van den Homberg proposed what he describes as a "multi-stage collaboration network for early integration of multiple perspectives on emerging and future crises." His presentation explored current "coherence mechanisms" within the Netherlands, and discussed preliminary observations of the effectiveness of the multi-stage collaboration network as implemented during a conflict assessment related to Somalia and as partially implemented during "the Mali dialogue." The approach seems promising but needs further pilot implementations and possible refinement. One particular lesson was the felt need for greater representation


² Some small adjustments were made to the Programme order of presentation in order to accommodate presentations done via video-link rather than in person. This discussion will track with the Programme rather than with the final ordering of papers as presented.

of the local (i.e., Somali) perspective during the analysis and planning phases. Hoogensen Gjørsv extended this concern as she emphasised the importance of all actors “on the ground” in a multi-actor bottom-up approach to developing a security framework. A key aspect of this approach is to carefully distinguish among all parties without, for example, assuming that non-governmental humanitarian organisations will have the same goals and operating principles as non-governmental developmental organisations or that local organisations will have the same goals and operating principles as their external counterparts. One important characteristic which distinguishes among the various actors is their perceived legitimacy, i.e., their moral, political and legal authority.

De Coning (not present) provides an important alternate perspective on the comprehensive approach in his paper. He describes how the extremely complex assemblage of organisations involved, and the processes they engage in, may be better understood through the lens of Complexity Theory. He discusses several aspects of the comprehensive approach: conflict analysis; design and planning; assessment and metrics; and management and coordination. His primary conclusions in many ways echo the comments of Hoogensen Gjørsv; in particular there is a need for greater attention to local actors and their perspective, with international actors giving up the notion that they can achieve a pre-defined outcome. A related recommendation which flows from the self-organising properties of complex systems, would be to reduce attempts to centrally control and manage the activities of many organisations. The alternative then is “... collaborative processes that are designed to create connections between partner institutions engaged in multidimensional and integrated peace operations, to ensure that the flow of information through the system is facilitated, supported and enhanced...”

3.2.2 Implications of the Cooperation between Diverse Agencies

The second session of the symposium began with two additional keynote addresses. Ltg (ret) Ton van Loon had extensive experience within multinational forces, including deployments in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and culminating in service as commander of 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps in Münster, Germany. Much of his career involved situations requiring integration of multinational military forces and/or coordination of military efforts with other agencies and organisations. He sketched his perspective on the comprehensive approach. First, this model should not be seen as the military adapting to everyone else, the military making everyone else adapt, or the military doing everyone else’s job. Rather, CA is a mindset and a commitment to long-term effects. A small portion of one of his charts, shown here illustrates the point about complex systems made by De Coning. Achieving successful outcomes within such a complex environment requires experience working within joint and interagency settings and the development of requisite competencies. Most of all, conscious deliberate and frequent attempts at open communication are critical to coordination and cooperation.



Ms. Eva Svoboda delivered the third keynote address of the symposium. Unlike the first two keynote speakers and many of the authors of submitted papers, Ms. Svoboda has the perspective of one involved in humanitarian and developmental efforts through non-governmental organisations. Her current position is that of a Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute, with prior

experience as field worker and coordinator for the International Committee of the Red Cross and other NGO's in a variety of countries. Svoboda pointed to one overarching challenge for cooperation, i.e., the fundamental difference in motivations and goals of militaries and humanitarian groups; the situation is further complicated when militaries take on unaccustomed roles such as first-responder in the case of natural disasters. She outlined several challenging opportunities for increased cooperation between the two communities: stabilisation missions; protection of civilians; providing security to aid workers; and restoration of the rule of law. In all of these situations "...we must not lose sight of the fact that humanitarian actors and military forces have different objectives in these situations and as much as is possible, we must retain enough distance from one another to remain true to those objectives."

The first paper in the second session was by Ekhaugen who described the Norwegian approach to implementation of the comprehensive approach. In an apparent policy paradox, Norway strongly endorsed this model, and yet maintained a strict divide of civilian and military efforts on the ground in Afghanistan. Hrychuk provided a description of the Canadian approach to implementation of CA and the evolution of their policies over the last several years. Mechanisms have been developed to foster communication and coordination across agencies, and there are observable variations in these mechanisms according to the apparent level of resources and institutional capacity required for a given intervention. The Pernik presentation described the Estonian model for cooperation among agencies in the particular case of cyber-security. A key feature of this approach has been a series of regular exercises intended to strengthen collaboration among governmental and civilian stakeholders.

De Church closed the second session with a theoretical model of leadership as it is found within the complex settings of a comprehensive approach, supplemented by empirical findings from several related explorations of this theory. There are three general principles of multiteam systems as defined by De Church and her colleagues. First, multiteam systems will bridge organisational boundaries, and so the leaders must themselves be boundary spanners. Second, leadership will involve multiple leaders working on local and global goals. Third, leaders will need to lead one another. De Church has been examining leaders' preferences within a multiteam system, as well as the optimal leadership structures. Results to date suggest leadership structures will favour members of one's own group, with little mutuality or reciprocity (i.e., accepting leadership from other leaders), and a desire to maintain status rather than create new inter-group structures. However results also suggest that more effective leadership networks will demonstrate influence across organisational boundaries, will include multiple influential leaders and many followers, and will include reciprocal relationships (with leaders influencing one another).

3.2.3 Competencies and Support for Complex Cooperation

The six papers in the third paper session continued the discussion of leadership and other competencies in the context of the comprehensive approach. Ohlsson discussed the implications of the CA context for leadership within the Swedish armed forces. Through analysis and a series of interviews she identified leadership challenges and related competencies including: communication skills; social skills; stress tolerance; conflict management skills; cultural competence; and emotion management skills. Desirable behaviours include: adaptability; inspiration; trust; cooperation; feedback; and behaving as a role model. Shockey drew from Schein's (16) body of work on Organisational Development, conducting semi-structured interviews on five themes: leadership; communications; organisational culture; reward and status systems; and conflict resolution systems. A comparison was made among responses from Canadian Defence personnel, those from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, those from CARE International, and those from the Canadian International Development Agency. Key observations include the issue of coordination among personnel within different agencies or sub-agencies in the field, inconsistencies in reward and status systems, and the overall need for better "vertical" communication between those in HQ's and those in the field. She suggests that better internal communication and coordination will enhance cross-organisational coordination and proposes an app for smart phones and tablets to facilitate information sharing. Baisini continued on the theme of communication difficulties, focusing her presentation on language issues which impede common

understanding. She highlighted certain “thick” concepts wherein words carry multiple levels of meaning and whose valuation and action components could vary widely across different audiences using a purportedly common language.

Thompson presented an empirical study on trust between members of different organisations as affected by different levels of knowledge about the other. Findings suggest that initial knowledge of the other organisation will enhance initial trust, but that trust violations will yield significant decreases in subsequent trust levels. She suggests that key to building initial trust would be knowledge of how the partner organisations might most effectively work together. While she does not explicitly highlight communication per se, it would seem that open and effective communication across organisational boundaries would be an important element in establishing and maintaining trust. Markel (via video link) presented some evidence which suggests that the required knowledge, skills and abilities required of military personnel in a Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) environment would vary by domain and by echelon.

The presentation by Van Bommel examined processes to overcome a lack of common understanding among various parties under a CA umbrella. She outlined an analysis of a Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) process as implemented within the Netherlands on six occasions. The general conclusion of participants is that this structured process for analysis and decision making has great utility. She cautions that the CDM should not be applied as a one-size-fits-all approach. The CDM may be too elaborate for many situations, and the team-building processes need to be tailor-fit to the individuals and organisations involved. Derbentseva (via video link) discussed the Canadian Toolbox for Multidisciplinary Collaboration (TMC); the aims of the TMC are to support development of common understanding, integration of different perspectives in team sensemaking and products, and support for the collaboration process within the team. As with the Dutch CDM, participants in pilot implementations of the TMC thought that the approach had potential value but requires further refinement and possible customising for specific circumstances.

3.2.4 Assessment of Interagency Cooperation

The fourth session of the symposium focused on Assessment concepts, beginning with a presentation by Essens on the development and application of an inter-team interaction model based on the concept of boundary spanning as the framework for observation and data collection during exercises. A key point is that the use of such a “logic model” of the processes of interest provides a framework not only for structuring observation but also for providing feedback and lessons learned. Results after application in two exercises suggest the concept and approach have utility for providing specific feedback to the participants on their interactions. The inter-team interaction model itself needs some small further refinements. As to the team processes, the data suggest that building cooperation and liaison are underestimated, undervalued, and underdeveloped. Troost then discussed a form of assessment of the assessment process itself. Troost examined publicly available documents on lessons learned from Dutch deployments in Afghanistan, and explored the extent to which those lessons had an impact on later Dutch planning for deployment in Mali. Despite the large differences in context and mission between the two interventions, Troost concludes that the lessons from the Afghanistan experience have led to changes in process and practice.

Verrall discussed the UK Integrated Approach and some of the issues involved in attempting to assess interagency cooperation within such a complex system. He suggested that one benefit of an assessment process could be support to evidence-based policy analyses, with lessons learned from one situation contributing to future adaptation and improvement. Klein provided an assessment of an ambitious Czech effort in international humanitarian assistance involving the evacuation of serious medical cases (including primarily paediatric cases) from Afghanistan to the Czech Republic for treatment and rehabilitation. The success of the program has been largely due to the ongoing coordination and cooperation between military and other government agencies as they deal with everything from visa issues to questions of transportation and housing. Ooms suggested the use of Design Science as an approach to the development of an Enterprise Architecture to model civil-military interactions. Such a model would provide a framework for assessing the effectiveness of such interactions, and also facilitate development of increased IT support.

3.2.5 Future Developments

The final paper session included two presentations. Ulrich made the provocative suggestion that the comprehensive approach within the context of crisis interventions could not hope to achieve success if the goal focus was the population. He proposed instead a focus on power-holders as essential influence agents within the local community. Rietjens concluded the session with a discussion of the Comprehensive Approach model. He argues that CA implementations have been improvisational and ad hoc due to the lack of an adequate theoretical basis. The fundamental notion that greater stability may be achieved through CA than with a military approach alone is apparently based on unproven notions about “the hearts and minds” of the local population, and there are numerous similar examples. Rietjens proposes that such assumptions and unstated “truths” be made explicit through the development of a formal theory on the CA. He provides suggestions on how such a theory might be developed in part by examination of recurring patterns in the practice of the Comprehensive Approach.

3.2.6 Breakout Groups

Three breakout groups were given two brief periods to discuss and prepare recommendations on Structures, Processes, and Competencies required to facilitate IAI and the CA. The working group reports were presented after the final paper session, and their recommendations have been incorporated into this report.

4.0 SYMPOSIUM CONCLUSIONS

Participants in the symposium represented military or other government research and staff agencies, academia, and private institutions. There were ten different nationalities represented, with many of the participants living and working outside of their home country. Three keynote addresses provided both military and civilian points of view. The papers covered a broad range of issues relating to the symposium topic of interagency interactions and governance in comprehensive approaches. Several themes emerged from the keynotes, papers, presentations and discussions that will be considered in more detail.

4.1 Technical Observations

4.1.1 Definitions

There is a general consensus that the Comprehensive Approach (CA), under whatever label, involves using the full resources of a government (or governments), including military and other government agencies, in combination with civilian non-governmental organisations, to address issues of local and regional stability and development. There is some concern that NATO-led operations may be conceived more narrowly given that NATO is by definition a military alliance. This places an extra burden on NATO planners to avoid “securitizing” all missions, and to communicate and coordinate with other parties who might provide the resources needed to execute an approach that is truly comprehensive. There is a consensus that military forces should, in general, avoid assuming direct responsibility for humanitarian or developmental missions.

4.1.2 Goals

Military forces are assembled, trained, and deployed to address military goals: defeat of an enemy, and provision of control and security in a region. Other parties involved in the region for some time will likely have different goals and may well have different understandings of commonly held goals such as “stability” and “security.” It can be argued that some aspects of security (e.g., suppression of active opposition to those deemed to be legitimate authorities) may well hinder achievement of other goals (e.g., development of robust mechanisms for self-government). From the earliest analysis and planning stages of an intervention, a continuing dialogue should focus on the range of goals and outcomes being addressed by all parties involved. Furthermore, explicit attention must be given to the goals of local organisations and other

stakeholders. Attempts to align or integrate the disparate goals held by the many parties involved may lead to better mutual understanding and provide the basis for ongoing cooperation. However, the reality is that there will likely be a distance maintained among the actors, allowing each to remain true to their own objectives.

4.1.3 Communication

Throughout the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive approach for intervention in a region, the single most important aspect is communication, person-to-person and among organisations. Effective open communication among all parties involved, including the media and private citizens, will help to establish and maintain a dialogue on the intent and long-term goals of the intervention. Disparate views may be aired and disagreements can at least be acknowledged if not resolved. In this regard, communication involves everything from the Strategic Communication seen in the UK Integrated Approach or the U.S. JIIM approach to frequent information exchanges among all parties before and during an intervention. As pointed out by van Loon in his keynote address, there are situations where governments' propensity to classify information is justified. However, widespread often arbitrary classification can severely impede communication with local and international partners.

Effective communication begins with the establishment of a relationship, i.e., an understanding of a common need and some knowledge of the other parties. In the present context it also involves three additional components: policy, processes/channels, and language. From top down, the organisations involved must have a solid policy commitment to information sharing. Processes must be established to support information-push to relevant partners, while also supporting information queries and search. Sharing of verbal or written information, however, may in fact cause more confusion than coordination if the message cannot be understood by the recipient. Persons who allegedly speak a common language may easily ascribe different meanings to the same words; effective communication will include a feedback loop whereby the recipient restates their understanding of the message. The use of in-group jargon and acronyms in lieu of words can only create additional barriers to mutual understanding among persons with different backgrounds and perspectives.

4.1.4 Phases or Stages of a Crisis

There is a general, almost implicit, assumption that the content and structure of any Comprehensive Approach will vary according to the "stage" of development of a crisis.³ Various stage models have been suggested. For example Hull, in the 2010 HFM-204 Workshop, (2) discussed: Analysis; Planning; Implementation; Monitoring; and Evaluation. In a slight variation, De Coning discusses: Analysis; Planning; Implementation; Management and Coordination; and Assessment. Is this nothing more than different choices of the appropriate synonyms to use in a paper? Or is De Coning's "Management and Coordination" intended to imply a more active role by an implementation authority than Hull's "Monitoring"? Van den Homberg in this symposium uses a different set of stages in his model: Pre-intervention; Crisis Identification; Estimation and Options; Response Direction; Current Operations; and Crisis Review. There may be value to this extension of the Hull and the De Coning models through the explicit addition of Pre-Intervention and Crisis Identification. The ensuing discussion of policies and actions appropriate for these early stages may lay the groundwork for more effective training and development of personnel for work in developing a comprehensive approach in a given situation. But is it necessary to re-label Analysis and Planning as one merged Estimation and Options stage? The stage-model approach may be useful as a framework for designing various tools and procedures to assist in intra- and inter-agency coordination. However, the proliferation of new stage models would seem to reduce the possible value of any such tools or procedures, as the differences in the underlying models would make sharing and widespread implementation

³ I will leave aside the issue as to whether a stage model is the most appropriate representation of the development of a crisis. But it should be noted that, for example, the real world may not allow time for in-depth analysis and planning prior to deployment. Thus, organisations, policies or procedures developed on the assumption of a steady deliberate progression from stage to stage may be unable to cope with many situations.

more difficult. E.g. tools to assist in Monitoring may be seen as irrelevant for those whose role has been labeled Management and Coordination.

4.1.5 Levels of Analysis

Some years ago Katherine Klein and Steve Koslowski made a substantive contribution to the solution of complex organisational problems through their discussion of multilevel research and associated analysis challenges (17). The Working Group 2 report from HFM-204 uses their three-level model [Micro, Meso, and Macro] as a framework for discussing theoretical and empirical work that relates to the Comprehensive Approach. However, there was little explicit attention in this symposium to the question of level-of-analysis. The following observations are offered. First, for the sake of clarity, it is important to stipulate what or who is the focus of an investigation. For example, when talking about intra-agency or inter-agency coordination, is the author talking about organisational dynamics? Or is the focus on the interpersonal dynamics which may come into play when individuals from different agencies attempt to work together? Those two different perspectives on the problem would be informed by quite different theoretical and empirical bases. Second, it is important to note that actions at the highest levels of government may best be viewed through the lens of lower-level theories. Thus, when a committee is formed of senior representatives from various agencies, the analysis could be at the organisational level, considering agency policies and practices, for example, which impede consensus on an appropriate set of goals and actions in a crisis intervention. It might be equally valuable to consider that example committee as a team of individuals working on a common task, and thereby bring to bear the vast literature on team processes. The perspective taken, i.e., the level of analysis chosen, will have a major impact on recommendations stemming from an analysis. In the example, an organisational perspective might lead to clarification of and improvement in policies and procedures. A team perspective might lead to recommendations on the development of individual skills for working with diverse others on a common task, or it might lead to policies concerning the stability of team membership over time.

4.1.6 Persons involved in CA

It is generally recognised that persons in different organisations are likely to have different perspectives on such fundamental issues as goals and actions. In this context, there is often a distinction made between military and civilian perspectives. For most purposes this gross differentiation will be inadequate and probably misleading as it masks the many subtle and not so subtle differences among various sub-groups. Are civilians who are employed by the military to be considered civilian or military? Are civilian security contractors, who most often are former military personnel, to be treated as civilian or military? Are military humanitarian personnel military or are they more like civilian humanitarian non-governmental personnel? Is a civilian contractor to U.S.A.I.D. a government or non-government actor? Civilian humanitarian workers are arguably different from civilian development workers in many key respects. In general it would seem that attention should be given to the goals, policies and practices of each of the many sub-groups rather than allowing the stereotyping which follows from making gross generalisations about such broad categories as “military” and “civilian”.

One large group of importance is the population of the region in question. This group of course is composed of many sub-groups, often with competing agendas and priorities. Structured planning processes (e.g., in the Netherlands as described by Van den Homberg) explicitly call for inclusion of local expertise in order to take account of these civilians. However, there is an open question as to what constitutes “expertise” in this context. How many Somali’s, for example, would it take to represent the interests of that population? Would a knowledgeable foreign cultural anthropologist have better insights than native members of rival clans? What validation steps will insure that the expert’s input has utility?

There is a general consensus that there are individual differences that impact individuals’ effectiveness in a setting that calls for interaction with others who have different perspectives, goals, etc. There is much less agreement on what knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) make a difference, nor on how to develop such

capacity. Furthermore, quite different KSAs might be required for initial analysis and planning than for on-the-ground coordination of activities. There is general consensus that experience matters. The assumption is that individuals will learn from a first instance of communicating or coordinating with disparate others and will somehow be better the second time. There is little evidence that such experiential learning takes place and little understanding of the conditions that might facilitate such learning. Even if we accept the experiential learning assumption, we are left with the organisational reality that persons seldom stay for long periods in the same roles and so those who have somehow gained from prior experience are not likely to be in a position to directly apply those lessons. In general, the personnel development and assignment infrastructure to support the range of activities called for under a comprehensive approach has been largely neglected. However, there seems to be some value in organisational solutions involving the semi-permanent assignment of personnel to a standing group which is called on in early stages of a crisis.

4.1.7 Forms of Interaction

Several typologies have been developed to describe the interaction among parties working under a comprehensive approach umbrella; e.g., disparate organisations may be said to compete, co-exist, communicate, coordinate, or cooperate. See Williams' paper for an extended discussion on this point. There is value in such distinctions to the extent that the concepts help us understand organisational dynamics. Consistent and systematic use of these distinctions, for example, help in descriptions of differences between Norwegian and Italian "on the ground" implementations of the comprehensive approach as described by Ruffa in this symposium. Taken together with a consistent usage of concepts relating to stages of a crisis [4.1.4 above], the resulting rich descriptive typology could provide a solid basis for describing, comparing, and contrasting deployments. For example, the Norwegian Paradox discussed by Ekhaugen in this symposium might seem less paradoxical if her analysis were to consider various stages of a crisis, levels of analysis, and the forms of interaction among actors at each of the several stages and levels. At the headquarters or departmental level there might be coordination and some cooperation while at the agency or sub-agency level there might be only occasional communication and limited coordination. Nevertheless, in the same scenario, actors in the field could be expected to cooperate closely or could equally well be expected to co-exist with little acknowledgement of the others' presence. Not only do we need to disentangle the impacts of the comprehensive approach at different levels, but as Ruffa points out, we also need to pay more attention to "...the perhaps misleading assumption that 'more coordination and more coherence' is always better."

4.1.8 Assessment and Feedback

A major concern for the organisers of this symposium was the issue of assessment, and several presentations addressed this topic to some degree. It would be extremely difficult to do a start-to-finish assessment of a given crisis intervention, much less to do a comparative evaluation of several interventions. The metrics would vary considerably depending on the stage of crisis intervention, and the logistics involved would be daunting. However Troost and others have shown it is possible to do some assessment after the fact based on public records, and Essens has shown that it is possible to capture much information about interaction and cooperation processes during operational analysis and planning sessions. The way forward probably involves continuing fragmentary assessment efforts with different individuals or teams looking at different aspects of the comprehensive approach at different stages of crisis intervention in different contexts with different actors. A major challenge then is to link and aggregate such assessments into a picture of the whole. Consistent use of a stage model, common understanding of the level(s) of analysis being addressed, and a common typology for the forms of interaction among participants would establish a useful framework for such an aggregation. An equal challenge is to effectively use individual or aggregated assessments to provide feedback to actors and agencies in a form that facilitates adaptive organisational learning and improved performance during the next crisis. One issue noted during symposium discussions was the need for outgoing commanders or directors to provide an assessment and "picture" of the situation to incoming replacements.

4.2 General Discussion

There are many Comprehensive Approaches; the basic model has been implemented in various ways across nations and even within nations over time. The fundamentals of the model as they impact policy and practice, however, seem to have been well integrated across many of the NATO member states. The implications of the model have also been well developed: e.g. the need for early and frequent communication among participating organisations; the difficulties of working across organisational boundaries; the need to understand and respect differences in goals and objectives; and the need for personnel training which replicates the interagency or inter-organisational challenges of communication, cooperation, and collaboration. Furthermore, a few nations have taken steps to learn from earlier deployments so as to improve their processes and procedures when planning for a new situation.

Unfortunately, there seems to have been little discussion about building the personnel infrastructure to support selecting, training, and assigning the most appropriate individuals to positions that would facilitate planning and execution of a comprehensive approach (18). There have been discussions, for example, about the desirability of cross-assignments of personnel among agencies in order to build a cadre of individuals with experience in dealing with others who hold different perspectives on appropriate goals and means. However, unless such practices are firmly embedded in personnel policies, then they will remain an *ad hoc* measure with value that lasts only until the next series of promotions and reassignments. Within militaries, the time that might be used to develop the special knowledge, skills, and abilities useful for operating within a comprehensive approach is time that might equally be used to prepare personnel for other critical needs. The resulting tradeoffs might well result in the development of civil-affairs specialists; as a distinct separate group, such specialists themselves may become part of the problem, isolated from fellow soldiers by differences in understanding and outlook. However, as noted, there has been little discussion on this broad topic and only isolated attempts to rigorously identify requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities.

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Consolidation

The general comprehensive approach has matured in the last decade, and lessons have been learned that may be used to strengthen the overall model. Thus, attention should be given to better articulating the relationships between policy and action at multiple levels and stages of a crisis intervention. First, greater attention is needed to the developing *stages of a crisis*. Several typologies have been offered; if a single typology of crisis development can be agreed upon, then actions within and between organisations and nations can be more systematically tied to a notional time-line. Second, agreement should be reached on a common typology of the *forms of interaction* among agencies; generally accepted understandings of the action implications of communicate, cooperate, coordinate, etc., could accelerate mutual understanding during planning and execution. Third, more attention should be given to the *levels of analysis* being addressed in research and policy analyses. Aggregation of knowledge about the comprehensive approach and of lessons learned from implementation will be greatly simplified if attention is given to this key feature.

5.2 Continued Efforts

While the comprehensive approach is an accepted and well understood model, it is not a well developed nor empirically supported *theory*. Additional attention should be given to examining the implicit and explicit assumptions of the model, with a distinct possibility that some aspects might be discarded where experience has shown the assumptions to be lacking. Further, there is a need for greater understanding of possible forms of *governance on the ground*. The multiteam systems model has particular value as a framework for explorations in this area. Additional effort should also be given to issues of *assessment and feedback*. More attention to *data collection in the field* is called for. As indicated in the discussion above, more consistent attention to typologies of stages, forms, and levels would help in the aggregation of lessons learned.

5.3 Gaps to be Addressed

Attention should be given to the *personnel infrastructures* needed to support nations' ongoing capacity to participate in comprehensive actions. Several key areas should be addressed: 1) Identification of requisite *individual knowledge, skills, and abilities*; 2) the impact of *cross-agency training* on personal adaptability and effectiveness in complex multiteam settings; and 3) necessary *career path and reward structures* to attract, develop, and maintain a corps of individuals proficient in planning and executing projects within a comprehensive approach.

5.4 Magic Happens

The recommendations above and within the papers presented in this symposium may seem to lack any connection to political and fiscal reality; to accomplish the suggested tasks will require significant ongoing research and development efforts. However, the fundamental tasks are well within the current science; we know how to rigorously identify KSA's, we know how to design and evaluate appropriate individual and team training. We have shown the value of several approaches to assessment and feedback and have the capability to construct effective lessons learned systems. Taking this from the realm of magic requires only organisational prioritisation of the required efforts and requisite resources to build and sustain the research and development capacity.

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